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CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN TONGA: TONGA’S 
IDEA OF RESPONSIBLE EXECUTIVE 




In 2010, as part of the process of political reform, constitutional amendments were instituted 
to the 1875 Constitution of Tonga
1
 to an extent and depth that have never been done before in 
Tonga’s constitutional history.2 It was a reform of the constitutional system3 involving a 
fundamental shift from a monarchical government system to a system in which the executive 
is responsible to a representative parliament—where legislative and executive powers are 
exercised by elected representatives who are ultimately responsible to the electorate. This 
was a process that was not only political, but also impacted culture and tradition in the sense 
that the traditional and cultural powers of the Monarch were enshrined and preserved in the 
Constitution since its promulgation in 1875. Guy Powles attributes the stability record of 
Tonga to the ‘unique amalgam of Tongan chiefly authority and British forms of government 
and law’ which was adopted and accepted by the people of Tonga since 1875.4  
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a short overview of how the 2010 reforms 
adopted by consensus approach diluted the power of the Monarch by amending the 
Constitution to effect the devolution of some of his Constitutional executive power to the 
Legislative Assembly. It should be noted that this approach ensured a relatively peaceful 
transition and reform in Tonga.
5
 However, in looking at the new changes instigated in 2010, 
there are two aspects of this system that invite close scrutiny, namely: 
 Chain of responsibility connecting power holders to the electorate. For example, 
many parliamentarians are now elected by people; parliament now chooses the prime 
minister, who in turn appoints ministers from parliament; and Cabinet is now 
controlled by parliament. 
 Nature and extent of the power and influence of the Monarch in the new form of 
government. For instance, the King’s discretion to appoint influential people to his 
Privy Council, to use his influence through appointments, and to bargain with the 
Government over the use of his veto to block Government bills. 
However, before examining these Constitutional developments of the new executive system, 
this paper will examine the executive system prior to 2010 political reform and the path that 
led to the reform. 
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THE EXECUTIVE SYSTEM PRIOR TO 2010 
The Constitution of Tonga laid down the foundation of government of a Constitutional 
Monarchical System where it enabled a government of three main bodies of Executive, 
Legislature and Judiciary.
6
 However, much like every other country, the Executive’s 
relationship with the Legislature is an essential ingredient of its role and function as is the 
case in Tonga under its Constitution.
7
 
The Constitution conferred political power and authority on the Monarch as Head of 
Government and as Head of State.
8
 This meant that the King and Cabinet comprised the Privy 
Council which served as Executive. The Executive of Prime Minister and Cabinet (which 
made up the Privy Council) was appointed by and responsible to the Monarch, and could be 
of as large a number as he chose. The Privy Council’s real impact in the overall scene was 
that: 
 it sat permanently in the Legislature, pursuing its policies, and watching the nine 
elected representatives of the people come and go; 
 their permanent seats in the Assembly which, with the support of the nine 
representatives of the Nobles, could dominate the Assembly; and 
 the Monarch had a substantial degree of control over Government especially the 
prerogative powers to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and Crown Ministers at 
the Monarch’s pleasure. This suggests that the Crown Ministers were directly 
responsible and accountable to the Monarch and not to Parliament or the people of 
Tonga. 
HOW POLITICAL REFORM WAS POSSIBLE - THE ‘ROAD MAP’ FOR CHANGE 
The political reform in 2010 is a product of the political history of Tonga where in the early 
1990s reform was initially directed at bringing about greater accountability rather than a 
demand for change.
9
 However, because of the lack of Government responses to these 
concerns, the peoples’ representatives and their supporters then pushed for change 
(elaborated further below) and for a more democratic government. The pressures for change 
eventually led to Government’s launching of its ‘road map’ for change and ultimately to the 
reform introduced in 2010. The ‘road map’ reflected the willingness of His Majesty George 
V to share his power to govern with the elected members of Legislature. 
The first official step toward reform occurred after the general election in March 2005, when 
His late Majesty King Taufa’ahau (Tupou IV, who died on 10 September 2006) appointed to 
Cabinet two elected nobles’ representatives and two elected people’s representatives and 
appointed one of the people’s representatives as Prime Minister in March 2006. This was the 
first ‘commoner’ to hold the position of Prime Minister. The pressure on Government and the 
Monarch came from the public service strikes and protest marches which concerned public 
service reforms and utility costs as well as political change between 2005 and 2006. This 
prompted the commissioning of the National Committee for Political Reform (Committee) by 
the Legislative Assembly which was endorsed by the King in October 2005. The Committee 
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produced a report and recommendation for change and proposed a timetable for the reform.
10
 
In October 2006, the new King George V publicly announced his support for political reform 
and volunteered to relinquish his constitutional authority. It is interesting to note that 
although George V is credited with his immediate support for political reform, he is criticized 
by many for insisting on some areas of influence, particularly in the appointment of key 
people such as all the judiciary, the Attorney-General, the Lord Chancellor, the Police 
Commissioner, in addition to existing powers such as ‘to pardon’, to appoint the Commander 
of the armed forces, and the powers in relation to law-making (assent/veto) and the 
legislature (convoke/dismiss).
11
 This could explain why, on 16 November 2006, riots in 
Tonga broke out. One of the many reasons was due to Government’s failure to accept a 
reform formula presented by certain representatives of the people. The pressure eventually 
led to the establishment of the Constitutional and Electoral Commission under the 
Constitutional and Electoral Commission Act in July 2008, which was passed in the 
Assembly and assented to by the King on 23 July 2008. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ELECTORAL COMMISSION  
In January 2009, the Commission was assembled and started almost immediately to meet 
their tight schedule under the legislation. This Commission comprised Tongans, most of 
whom had already been associated with reform in one way or another—the only palangi was 
the Chairman, a former Chief Justice well known in Tonga who had also been the Chief 
Justice in the Solomon Islands and was experienced in working with written constitutions.
12
 
Among the specific matters that the Commission was established to focus on was to enquire 
into the ‘roles, functions, powers, duties of, and relations between, the Monarch, the Privy 
Council, the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Relationship between the Executive and the 
Legislature, the composition of the Legislature.’13 
In November 2009, as part of the requirements of the enabling Act, the Commission 
produced its final report which was submitted to the Privy Council and the Legislative 
Assembly and was made available to the public.
14
 This report contained accounts of its 
analysis of the constitutional issues and how they weighed up the ‘competing considerations 
and offers advice as to where, in the Commission’s view, the best solution lie.’15 The report 
proposed 82 specific recommendations and draft amendments to the Constitution and other 
relevant statutes. Most of the recommendations were accepted (52), but as the Assembly 
worked through it, led by the Prime Minister and Ministers who held a majority, there were 




THE NEW EXECUTIVE SYSTEM 
Tonga’s form of government before 2010 was usually challenged as to whether it was a 
genuine constitutional monarchy. This was premised on the understanding that when the 
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Constitution was promulgated in 1875, the form of government under the constitutional 
principle of the rule of the Monarch was intended to reflect the Westminster model of 
responsible cabinet and independent judiciary.
17
 However, it was obvious that there were 
some areas that needed to be further developed in 2010, because the status of Tonga as a 
constitutional monarchy was re-confirmed in the amendments to the Constitution.
18
 This 
means that under Clause 30, the Government of Tonga will be a constitutional monarchy 
under His Majesty, his heirs and successions. It also means that there is an automatic 
succession under the Constitution, so that the successor assumes authority immediately, even 
if the coronation occurs later.  
Monarch does not exercise executive power directly, subject to certain exceptions 
The majority of the recommendations accepted were directly related to the reform in the 
devolution of royal authority and power, and vested in the people’s elected representatives 
the choice of who would constitute the Executive, and thus hold office only until the next 
general election, when they would have to ask the people to vote for them again.
19
  
For instance, Recommendation 2 proposed that the King and Privy Council shall no longer be 
part of the Executive Government of Tonga and the Executive Government shall be the 
Cabinet answerable to the Legislative Assembly. This was based on the understanding that 
the success of the responsible government requires that both the conduct of routine 
administration and the performance of specific statutory functions be entrusted to ministers 
who are accountable ultimately to the electorate.
20
 It is important to note however, that there 
was an overwhelming public support shown in the Constitutional and Electoral 
Commission’s final report, for enshrining the Monarch’s position as a safety measure to 
guard against unconstitutional actions by the Government. 
However, as a result of this recommendation, Clause 30 of the Constitution was amended to 
remove the King and Privy Council from the Executive as the first body of Government and 
replace with the Cabinet. Now the Executive is comprised by Cabinet only and it precludes 
the King from intervening directly in day-to-day conduct of the administration of ministries 
or government departments.
21
 It is important to note that the Monarch still has absolute 
discretion on the appointments to the Privy Council under Clause 50 and the power of pardon 
under Clause 37.  
The big shift after 2010 was to an executive of Prime Minister and fixed-size Cabinet which 
did not get near the Legislature until its members were first elected by their own 
constituencies, whom they would have to face again in four years. This created the essence or 
principle of the reform, but exceptions have been created under Clause 51(7).
22
 The wording 
of this clause is interesting because the clause was necessary in order to prevent the 
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devolution principle as expressed in Clause 51(1) from depriving the Monarch of all other 
powers. It is an acknowledgement that those other powers are indeed ‘executive’ in character 
but do not devolve.  
These exceptions to the principle of the devolution of executive power can be looked at from 
two points of view. One view held by the traditionalist Tongan is that the people have trusted 
their Monarch for so long that the best course of action is to continue to do so. The 
Monarch’s wide influence as the hau or traditional leader entitles him/her to exercise royal 
prerogatives wherever there are gaps. This means that there is no need to scrutinize the law in 
great detail in order to define terms, to draw lines and pursue strictly correct answers. In fact, 
it is rather disloyal to do so. 
Another view is that, one may felt that in this time of rapid change and globalization, the 
incumbent Monarch, whoever it may be, is also not immune from taking on new ideas and 
seeking new directions and policies for the nation. Accountability will be raised by an ever-
vigilant population. 
Government by Prime Minister and Cabinet 
One of the major changes codified by the amendments relates to the composition of the new 
Legislative Assembly and Cabinet. These changes include increasing of the number of the 
representatives of the people from 9 to 17. The Prime Minister is an elected Member of 
Parliament who is elected by the members of parliament and appointed by the King according 
to the wishes of Parliament.
23
 The King also appoints the Cabinet Ministers on the advice of 
the Prime Minister, who may nominate to ministerial posts, not more than four persons who 
are not elected representatives (Clause 51(2)) provided that the number of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet does not exceed half the elected members of Parliament minus the Speaker. 
Interestingly, both the Committee (NCPR) and the Commission disliked the concept, but the 
Government during the discussion of the reform, pushed it through. Today, the Prime 
Minister and elected representatives of Cabinet remain as representatives of their electorates. 
This is a remarkable development because before 2010, Clause 51 allowed the Monarch to 
appoint the Prime Minister and the Ministers at the King’s pleasure. Essentially, the King 
could hire and fire Ministers at will, and they were not elected Members of Parliament who 
the electorate could punish for bad performance by not re-electing to the Assembly. That was 
one of the situations that the reform sought to avoid or it would defeat the ideal of responsible 
government that the executive be responsible to parliament and therefore indirectly to the 
electorate. 
It is important to note the considerable power and responsibility that is now given to the 
people. The most important power that people now possess is that their representatives make 
up the majority of parliamentarians, almost 70 percent. Arguably, this means greater 
accountability of government to parliament and the electorate.  
However, it is important to emphasize that because of the new arrangement of Cabinet, there 
can never be a majority Government in Tonga which means that Government will always 
need the support of non-government members in order to pass business in the Assembly.  
In reality, political parties may form out of the Government’s need to have consistent support 
to implement its policies. Similarly, Members of Parliaments who oppose the Government’s 
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policies may form an opposition. However, it is interesting to note that during the political 
reform consultation process, neither the Committee (NCPR) nor CEC recommended in their 
report that there be formal political parties. Hence, when the reform legislation was debated 
in the House in late 2009 and 2010, the issue of establishing formal parties was never 
discussed or raised. Thus, political parties are not formally recognized. This means that 
elected members must discuss informally amongst themselves their nomination for Prime 
Minister. Such discussion will culminate in the official submission of nominations for Prime 
Minister to the Office of the Assembly within 14 days of return of writs. Within three days 
from the last date of receipt of nominations, a special sitting must be called by an Interim 
Speaker (appointed by the King) where elected representatives would formally elect a person 
who would be recommended to the King for appointment as Prime Minister.  
Vote of No Confidence 
The ‘vote of no confidence’ is a mechanism for regulating and making government 
accountable to the wishes of the people and such has never existed before in Tonga. Most 
other Pacific Islands countries provide for it.
24
 However, what is not stated in the Constitution 
are the reasons whereby a vote of no confidence might be brought against a Prime Minister. It 
is usually regarded as a political decision.  
Procedurally, a motion will not be effective if it is made within 18 months after a general 
election, within six months before the next general election, or within 12 months after a 
previous vote of no confidence. Further such a motion should not be moved unless at least 
five working days notice of the intention has been given to the Speaker.
25
 Paragraph 174 of 
the CEC final report suggests that motions for vote of no confidence should be ‘…used only 
when there has been a clear loss of confidence and not simply for personal political 
advantage….’ This is an ambiguous prescription because it is difficult not to act politically in 
a politically charged environment such as parliament. Perhaps Tonga will develop rules for 
such motions. A Bill to amend Clause 50B to require two-thirds majority vote was introduced 
in March of this year and referred to the Standing Law Committee. This would hopefully 
discourage motions that did not have overwhelming support. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Tonga is in the testing time of this new executive system.
26
 The feature of vote 
of no confidence was put to the test in June 2012. The actual voting on the motion took place 
about four months later and it was not successful. Part of the reasons for this was blamed on 
the inability of the Constitution and relevant Standing Order and Rules to provide the 
procedure. On the other hand, this can be seen as a Government tactic to buy more time to 
make up the number to ensure that the motion will not succeed.
27
 Whatever the reason may 
be, it just goes to illustrate the failure of the system to cater and accommodate for the new 
developments, which may have just damaged the confidence of the electorate in their 
representatives and the hope for a responsible executive. Similarly, this may have just 
provided the justification for Monarch’s influence and retention of some of his executive 
powers. However, what is apparent so far is that, Tonga’s idea of a responsible executive is to 
strike a balance in the exercise of executive powers between the Monarch and Cabinet.  
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